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Cogliendo lo spunto di Altieri, che cerca di superare la decostruzione 
postmoderna  del soggetto, si vuol suggerire che la crisi del soggetto è già 
decisamente attraversata dallo Svevo nell’arco degli anni a cavallo della 
Grande Guerra e segnatamente nella Coscienza di Zeno.  È proprio la 
guerra che rende imprescindibile per lo scrittore il quesito autobiografico sulle 
proprie responsabilità e sulla sua autonomia come individuo, come anche il 
quesito antropologico sul come e perché della guerra.  Si cerca qui, 
soppesando recenti contributi critici su Svevo,  di tracciare le linee del 
tentativo di Svevo di “ricostituire” l’io attraverso lo scrivere tramite il rapporto 
instaurato tra la saltuaria “coscienza” del protagonista, gli altri personaggi, 
l’autore implicito e il lettore. 
 
 
This is how Charles Altieri opens his chapter on ‘Reconstituting 
Subjects’: 
 
                                                
1 An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the conference on 'The importance of Italy' 
held on 21-23 September 2001 by the Australasian Centre for Italian Studies and the 
Humanities Research Centre at the Australian National University, Canberra.  Translations of 
quotations in this paper are mine. 
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The project of undoing humanist self-congratulation 
required transforming intentionality into textuality.  
Then, rather than concentrate on the nobility of 
writers’ aspirations to mean, critics could force readers 
to confront the contingencies and the slippages in the 
objects actually produced: and rather than dream of 
taking personal responsibility for history, we would 
have to face history’s awesome power over us, even in 
shaping the very terms by which we imagined 
ourselves to be shaping it.  But having disseminated 
meanings into textual operations, theory still needs 
some category by which to explain what calls us to 
modes of response and responsibility within this new 
freedom.  And having developed powerful tools for 
cultural critique, theory finds itself without strong 
accounts of how it might serve social ends or  to 




This formulation is an extremely helpful prop in approaching the 
problematic posed by subjectivity in Svevo, as I shall try to show.  
Altieri is taking as read the deconstruction of the subject as 
autonomous moral agent resulting from Wittgenstein’s renegotiation of 
“I” from its pronominal status as an effect of language on the one hand 
and on the other hand Althusser’s equation of the subject with 
subjection within societal processes – a deconstruction further pursued 
by Barthes and Derrida.  Hence his quest to reconstitute subjects. 
“Barthes and Derrida set the stage superbly,” writes Altieri, summing 
up his discussion of their critique of the subject, “by calling into 
question the traditional equation of subjective identity with 
self-reflexive consciousness.”  This is still very relevant to the Svevian 
                                                
2 Charles Altieri,Canons and Consequences: Reflections on the Ethical Force of Imaginative 
Ideals.  Evanston, ILL: Northwestern University Press, 1990, Ch. 7 “Reconstituting 
Subjects”: 193-223 (193). 
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problematic.  Approaching the conclusion of his chapter, Altieri draws 
on Foucault to get beyond this impasse, but affirms the need to go 
“well beyond” Foucault as well: 
We need versions of first-person singularities that will sustain much 
richer third-person forms of judgement binding individuals to 
collective norms, at least in those arenas like economics and politics 
where rights and obligations remain inescapable concerns.  An ethics 
that cannot address those concerns ultimately cannot even speak 
adequately about the beauty of an individual life ...  The more we 
stress singularity, the more we also need terms for mutual intelligibility 
and mutual trust.  The more we fear the tyranny of subjection, the 
more we must develop a dialectical sense of how agents can use 
cultural grammars without being entirely subsumed within the 
parameters of those grammars; otherwise we risk fleeing one tyranny 
by cultivating the even more destructive confines of solipsism and a 




                                                
3 Ibid.: 222-3. 
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Positing the nation-state as the polar opposite to the micropolitics of 
the self has a peculiar ring in a world in which the term “globalisation” 
hides a long-standing reality under the guise of a forward agenda, but 
this point too is teasingly relevant to the Svevian problematic.
4
  In fact, 
it provides a convenient cue to get closer to my subject.  Shortly after 
the outbreak of the Great War, in August 1914, Ettore Schmitz, alias 
Italo Svevo, travelled on behalf of his in-laws’ firm of manufacturers of 
ship’s paint, going from Trieste, then part of Austria-Hungary, to 
Cologne in Germany, which was Austria-Hungary’s ally.  His job was 
to supervise the commencement of paint production in a local factory.  
At such a moment, it is hard to imagine that the customer in Germany 
could be any other than the German Imperial Navy.  The 
world-famous Veneziani underwater paint had greater strategic 
importance that one might think.  It retarded the fouling of ships’ hulls 
by marine growths, thus enabling the vessels treated with it to maintain 
higher speeds and go for longer periods without overhauls: two 
considerable advantages in the naval war which was developing 
between Britain and Germany (as well as between other belligerent 
navies).  The Veneziani firm had been supplying the British and other 
navies from as far back as 1901.  Ettore Schmitz, writing to his wife in 
German on open postcards, told her on 3 September:  “You know how 
I’ve always pursued the interests of the firm but this time I cannot 
persuade myself to desire its interests.”
5
  This lack of enthusiasm 
overrides Svevo’s affection for the country where he received his 
education between 1874 and 1878 and his admiration for the efficiency 
                                                
4 This essay was first drafted before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World 
Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. That event forces a 
re-conceptualisation in terms that go beyond the nation state (the USA) to embrace 
transnational systems such as the potentially totalising claims of global capital on the one hand 
and monotheism on the other and the “subject” status of investors and  “martyrs.” 
5 “Du weisst wie ich am Interesse des Hauses halte aber ich kann mich dieses Mal nicht 




and unity of purpose of the German people as they went into war, 
although Germany and Austria were still nominal allies of Italy, to 
which he avowed loyalty.  Yet he complies with his firm’s business 
imperative. 
The Great War thus brought to a head two moral issues which had 
been looming on the horizon for Schmitz-Svevo since the beginning of 
the century – indeed, since he had thrown in his lot with the Veneziani 
business in 1899.  One was his pacifism, which was heightened by the 
horrific scale and technological intensity of the war;  and the other his 
knowledge that he and the firm he worked for were enriching 
themselves out of that war.  In a diaristic jotting dated April 1905 and 
recording his return from his fourth trip to London, involving as it did 
a train journey across Italy, France and England, he notes: 
“Attraversando tanta vita che non amo pur mi commossi e a tutti i 
campi vicini e lontani augurai di cuore di dare doppia messe affinché i 
popoli sieno ricchi e buoni.” [Traversing so much life towards which I 
bear no love I was nevertheless moved and I wished all the fields both 
close and distant a bumper harvest so that the peoples may be rich and 
good.]
6
  This ties up with Svevo’s lifelong preoccupation with lotta — 
strife or struggle. This provides the title of the short story which was 
his first published literary work, and is the structuring concept of Una 
vita, extrapolated from Darwin and intertwined with the 
Schopenhauerian bellum omnium contra omnes. It passes through the 
para-scientific speculation of the unpublished essay “La corruzione 
dell’anima”
7
 and several war-time literary fragments of a humanitarian 
pacifist bent and finally culminates in the drafts for a pacifist 




                                                
6 Italo Svevo, Racconti - Saggi - Pagine Sparse, ed. B. Maier, Milan: Dall’Oglio, 1968: 821. 
7 Ibid.: 641-3. 
8 Ibid.: 649-62.  The thematic of strife and its avoidance and the presence of the Great War in 
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That philanthropical motif of the 1905 diaristic note recurs in 
another jotting dated 13 June 1917 – the period that we could call the 
prehistory of La coscienza di Zeno:   
 
                                                                                                        
Svevo’s work is discussed in  J. Gatt-Rutter, “Non-commitment in Italo Svevo,” Journal of 
European Studies, 3 (1973): 123-146, and taken up again in B. Moloney, “La coscienza di 
Zeno come romanzo di guerra,” Problemi, May-August, 1995: 159-78, repr. in B. Moloney, 
Italo Svevo narratore: lezioni triestine, Gorizia: Editrice Goriziana, 1988: 95-113.  A broader 
discussion of lotta in Svevo is E. Saccone, “Struggles, war, revolution and literature in some 
stories by Italo Svevo,” in David Bevan (ed.), Literature and Revolution, Amsterdam, Atlanta 
GA: Rodopi, 1989: 63-79. 
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Quattro anni or sono, poco prima della guerra 
mondiale, intrapresi un grande viaggio che mi fece 
attraversare l’intera Europa.   Ricordo che, passando, 
augurai che tutti i campi dessero buoni frutti e che i 
contadini vestiti nelle più varie fogge avessero il 
premio dovuto al loro lavoro.  E mi parve di aver fatto 
una grande cosa e che Napoleone avrebbe potuto 
invidiarmi.  Poi, quando scoppiò la guerra mondiale, 
io ebbi dolore per ogni disfatta perché io, certamente, 





[Four years ago, shortly before the world war, I 
undertook a major journey which took me across the 
whole of Europe.  I recollect that, as I passed by, I 
wished fruitful yields upon all the fields and upon the 
country people dressed in the most varied costumes 
the due reward for their toil. And it seemed to me that 
I had done a great deed, one which Napoelon might 
have envied me.  Then, when the world war broke 
out, I was grieved by every defeat for I, for sure, had 
not needed to be freed from hatred by war.] 
 
                                                
9 Racconti, cit.: 828. 
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Here we have the close connection between the Great War and the 
autobiographical urge.  This urge appears not to have surfaced in 
Svevo for over ten years.  There had been the well-known “Noto 
questo diario...” of December 1902. This he abandoned after half a 
page in disgust at the imagery of aggression and strife which surfaced 
in it and within himself.
10
  There is the already quoted passage from 
April 1905 about travelling across Europe, and the note of 10-1-1906 
about the years passing without leaving a trace.
11
  Now, in 1917, 
Svevo’s widow recorded, “he began to collect his ideas on numerous 
scraps of paper for a book of memoirs which was never completed,”
12
 
and she quotes from the same passage from which I have just quoted.  
Yet the only other surviving reflective passage with an 
autobiographical implication securely attributable to this period is that 
of 25 October 1917, which concludes: 
 
Con le persone che “non conosciamo” c’è una sola 
difficoltà: siamo ancora meno sinceri del solito. Forse 
quando usciremo dallo spazio e dal tempo ci 
conosceremo tanto intimamente tutti che sarà quella la 
via alla sincerità.  Ci daremo subito del “tu” e 
c’irrideremo tutti come meritiamo.  Morirà finalmente 
la letteratura che fa purtroppo tanta intima parte del 




                                                
10  Ibid.: 818. 
11 Ibid.: 822. 
12 Livia Veneziani Svevo, Vita di mio marito, text by Lina Galli, 2nd ed. with notes by Anita 
Pittoni, Trieste: Lo Zibaldone, 1958: 92. 
13 “With people whom we don’t ‘know’ there’s just one difficulty: we are even less sincere than 
usual.  Perhaps when we go outside time and space we shall all know one another so 
intimately that that will be the path towards sincerity.  We will all ‘thou’ one another and 
laugh at one another as we deserve. That will be the final death of literature which is all too 




This in effect displaces the possibility of knowledge of another self to a 
dimension beyond time and space, a metaphysical dimension that 
sounds like an afterlife, but is also the afterlife of literature.  Literature 
is thus posited as the problematical attempt to achieve this “sincerity,” 
this transparency of one’s own self and that of others.  In default of a 
true metaphysical dimension outside time and space, literature provides 
a quasi-metaphysical dimension, a hypothetical sphere in which we can 
explore and investigate human motivation and the workings of the 
mind, and approximate to the desired “sincerity,” to human truths.   




But Svevo abandons autobiography proper (which he implicitly 
includes in “literature”)
14
 for its fictive analogue, centred on the figure 
of Zeno in La coscienza di Zeno. 15   Since he never divulged his 
reasons for doing this, we can only speculatively explore the issues 
involved.  And since the figure of Zeno only in some salient respects 
(his lifelong resolve to give up smoking, the moral lineaments of his 
wife) resembles his creator, we can also only speculatively explore the 
connections between the two.  However, the reflective passage by 
Svevo whose conclusion I have just discussed suggestively fits the 
narrative framework of the autobiographical fiction which is La 
coscienza di Zeno, and in which Zeno’s voice (and, to lesser extents, 
those of his psychoanalyst and of the people in Zeno’s life as recalled 
by him) is suspended “outside time and space” in the 
quasi-metaphysical dimension vouchsafed by writing. 
                                                
14 The hazards, difficulties and limits of autobiography have been widely explored.  One 
vindication of the genre in the face of deconstructive critiques is Paul John Eakin, Touching 
the World:  Reference in Autobiography, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.  
From a different angle, the subterfuges employed in articulating some female autobiographies 
are  illuminatingly discussed in Paola Splendore, “La difficoltà di dire ‘io’: l’autobiografia 
come scrittura del limite.” In A. Arne and M. T. Chialant (eds.) Al racconto delle donne: voci 
– autobiografie – figurazioni. Naples: Liguori, 1990: 71-87.  I am indebted to Mirna Cicioni 
for this reference. 
15 Many of the stories printed in Racconti... have greater or lesser autobiographical elements and 
may be said to constitute, along with the three novels and some of the plays, Svevo’s 
“autobiography of the possible.’” A few unfinished stories were drafted before the war, most 
after, especially the more ambitious and complete ones.  Some may have been started 
towards the end of the war and may have been included among Svevo’s autobiographical 
efforts mentioned by his widow (see below).  The most closely autobiographical narrative 
piece is the one published under the title “L’avvenire dei ricordi” [Memories and their 
afterlife, Racconti:  297-304], which appears to be a very slightly fictionalised reconstruction 
of the first arrival of the two elder Schmitz brothers at the boarding school in Segnitz, 
Germany, where they were to spend four years.  The existing draft was written after the war, 
and is different in its epistemology from La coscienza di Zeno, the various fragments of its 
sequel, and some of Svevo’s other late stories, which all develop a critical model of 
knowledge and judgement of the self following on from Svevo’s first two novels, published in 
the 1890s. La coscienza is clearly the culminating point and the turning point in this critique 
of the self. 
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Svevo did of course put his name to the Profilo autobiografico – an 
autobiography of sorts, written in the third person from a first draft by 
his friend, the journalist Giulio Césari, and then much revised by 
Svevo himself.
16
  This conceals as much as, or more than, it reveals, 
and fulfils the “autobiographical pact” in the sense of presenting the 
author’s desired public image.
17
  It starts off by trying to explain away 
the unpatriotic-sounding pseudonym “che sembra voler affratellare la 
razza italiana e quella germanica” [which seems to imply a brotherhood 
between the Italian and the Germanic races] to an officially 
ultra-nationalist Fascist Italy who had ten years earlier won a 
horrendous war against the Germanic powers.  And it devotes much 
space also to explaining away what Svevo’s critics saw as his 
dilettantism, his failure ever to devote himself entirely to literature.  In 
doing so, it is a systematically deceitful public relations exercise, 
making out, first, that Ettore took up employment as a clerk at the 
Unionbank in 1880 because of his father’s financial collapse, which in 
fact did not come until 1882;  second, that he joined the Veneziani 
paint-manufacturing firm in 1899 because of the failure of Senilità, 
whereas in fact he was already actively seeking an entry into the firm 
before Senilità was published in 1898; and third, that his pen was idle 
for virtually the entire period from 1899 to the last years of the war, 
whereas in fact scarcely a year went by without at least some modest 
(though unpublished) literary output on his part.
18
 
                                                
16 This was first published in the posthumous publicity volume Italo Svevo scrittore - Italo 
Svevo nella sua nobile vita distributed free by the new publisher of Svevo’s novels, Giuseppe 
Morreale (Milan, 1929) and reproduced with notes and a “Postfazione” by Paolo Briganti 
(Parma: Edizioni Zara, 1985).  The Profilo autobiografico  is also contained in Italo Svevo, 
Racconti..  cit.: 799-810, to which I refer.  The typescript copy of Césari’s draft was 
reproduced by Bruno Maier in the volume edited by Marco Marchi, Italo Svevo oggi, 
Florence: Vallecchi, 1980: 231-51. 
17 See Philippe Lejeune, Le Pacte autobiographique, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975;  On 
Autobiography, translated by Katherine Leary, foreword by Paul John Eakin, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
18 For the relevant statements in Profilo autobiografico, see Racconti ..., cit,:  799, 800, 805;  
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for the contrary evidence see John Gatt-Rutter, Italo Svevo: A Double Life, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988: 48-51, 155, 161-2, 167-9, 202, etc (or idem, Alias Italo Svevo: vita dello 




The “autobiographical pact” here is certainly not situated beyond 
time and space in a dimension of transparent truth and sincerity.  The 
investments of the public self are very much in evidence.  But Paolo 
Briganti has also ably shown how apparently inconsequential remarks 
in the Profilo are traces of more hidden investments by that self which 
do not lend themselves so readily to the distinction between public and 
private.
19
  One of these traces Briganti accounts for as a trace of a 
narrative previously outlined in a letter to Prezzolini, but does not 
explain.
20
  This is Svevo’s reference, in the Profilo autobiografico, to 
his pacifist treatise:   
 
E lo Svevo s’accinse ad un’opera quasi letteraria, un 
progetto di pace universale suggerito dalle opere dello 
Schücking e del Fried.  Naturalmente a questo mondo 
non si può mai pensare niente senza arrivare al padre 
d’ogni letteratura, l’Alighieri.  Con un certo ribrezzo 





                                                
19 Paolo Briganti, “Postfazione” to the reproduced volume Italo Svevo scrittore - Italo Svevo 
nella sua nobile vita, 1985 (see note 11 above): xli-lii. 
20 Ibid.: xlix-l. 
21 Svevo, Racconti...:. 808. (“And Svevo undertook a quasi-literary work, a project for universal 
peace suggested by the works of Schücking and Fried.  Naturally one cannot in this world 
follow any idea without getting back to the father of all literature, Dante Alighieri.  With a 
slight shudder, Svevo resigned himself.  The resulting work no longer exists.” The reference 
to Dante probably involves the De Monarchia, a utopian tract which urges the pacification of 
Christendom under imperial rule.) 
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Three draft pieces of Svevo’s pacifist project have in fact survived,
22
  
though Svevo appears never to have tried to publish them.  To call 
attention to something as no longer existing seems a highly  
idiosyncratic speech act.  It highlights a significant absence, a silence, 
it plants a clue to something in the literary creation that is being 
heralded, the novel La coscienza di Zeno, born out of the war and 
published not long after, and – perhaps – prompted in part by a 
thwarted pacifist urge: “Nel diciannove .. [Svevo] s’era messo a 
scrivere La coscienza di Zeno. Fu un attimo di forte travolgente 
ispirazione.  Non c’era possibilità di salvarsi.  Bisognava fare quel 
romanzo.  Certo, si poteva fare a meno di pubblicarlo, diceva.”
23
   
The Profilo highlights the Great War as the catalyst of Svevo’s 
grand return to novel-writing (“Lo Svevo continuò a vivere fra violino 
e fabbrica fino all scoppio della guerra.” 806. “Allo scoppio della 
guerra italiana lo Svevo si trovò chiuso a Trieste.” 808), largely, it is 
true, by the leisure it enforced on him.  This leisure was filled with 
four main elements:  psychoanalytical pursuits and reflections on war 
and peace (signalled in the Profilo) and literary and autobiographical 
interests (mentioned in his widow’s Vita di mio marito.)  Of these, the 
pacifist investment is the least self-evident and has been the least 
investigated. 
                                                
22 These are in Racconti ..., cit.: 649-62, collectively headed Sulla teoria della pace. 
23 Racconti: 808. (“In 1919 ... [Svevo] had started writing La coscienza di Zeno.  It was a 
moment of powerful, overwhelming inspiration.  There was no escape.  That novel had to be 
written.  Of course, it didn’t have to be published, he used to say.”  (The reference to Dante 
probably involves the De Monarchia, a utopian tract which urges the pacification of 
Christendom under imperial rule.) 
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Svevo criticism has in fact not given much weight to the entry of the 
war into the narrative of La coscienza di Zeno.24  It is almost taken for 
granted as an empirical given that war is the deus ex machina that 
supplies the novel’s resolution.  There has been little or no 
examination of how it constitutes an epiphany directed at the reader 
over the heads of the characters who are “writers” within the novel – 
Zeno himself, and his piratical editor, the psychoanalyst Dr S.  Little 
attention has been given to the structuring and abrupt restructuring of 
the novel’s chronotope.  Why does Svevo have Zeno meet Dr S. and 
embark on recording his experiences early in 1914, just a few months 
before the outbreak of war?  And why does Zeno’s relationship with 
the Doctor run for nearly a year, including first the writing of his 
recollections and then the actual treatment dating from roughly a 
month or two before the outbreak of the Great War in early August 
1914 until about a month before the Italian intervention of May 1915 
which catches Zeno and his family on opposite sides of the 
Austrian-Italian frontier?  And why, after that again, does Zeno’s diary 
extend, with long gaps, almost another year?  From a narrative 
conducted, in chapters 2 to 7, seemingly outside historical time, or 
unrelated to it, and centred always in Trieste, the eighth chapter 
suddenly takes the form of dated diary entries (with the presence of war 
rapidly but nonchalantly invoked: “In questa città, dopo lo scoppio 
della guerra, ci si annoia più di prima” [Life in this town, since war 
broke out, is more boring than before]) and moves the narrative scene, 
for the epiphany of war itself, on a deceptively idyllic spring day, to a 
rural area along the frontier, on the other side of the Carso plateau from 
Trieste.   
                                                
24 The main exceptions are those mentioned in footnote 7 above. The biographical and thematic 
importance of the war for Svevo, but only to a lesser extent the structuring role of war in his 
third novel, are illuminatingly discussed in Gabriella Contini, Il romanzo inevitabile: temi e 




History, from being parodied in Zeno’s date fetishism over “last 
cigarettes,” now comes into its own in deadly earnest, overtaking Zeno 
in a new scansion of narrative time in which the narrator is no longer 
the redactor or manipulator of his past but is carried on by an 
ever-moving present and subject to the onrush of an unknown future 
(the sequel to La coscienza di Zeno, “Un contratto,” overturning the 
novel’s ending in which Zeno has achieved financial success and 
imagined health).  This is what, with regard to the teasingly parallel 
narrative of Hašek’s The Good Soldier Švejk, Bernshtein, developing 
the ideas of Bakhtin and Likhachev, called “epic time” or “open time,” 
but could simply be called “historical time.”
25
  It is the time of patent 
collective responsibility, affording a scale against which to measure 
individual responsibility or irresponsibility, even while facing 
“history’s awesome power over us.”  The war is a major, and 
structuring, signifier in the narrative of La coscienza di Zeno. 
As he moves out of the Schopenhauerian cognitive dimension of 
memory,
26
 and is enmeshed in the present tense of action, Zeno loses 
what coscienza he may have achieved and exults in his apparent 
triumph in the struggle for life and his success in war-time commerce:  
“Ammetto che per avere la persuasione della salute il mio destino 
dovette mutare e scaldare il mio organismo con la lotta e soprattutto col 
trionfo.  Fu il mio commercio che mi guarí e voglio che il dottor S. lo 
sappia.” (477) [I do admit that in order for me to be persuaded of my 
                                                
25 “One may say that in the novel [Sašek’s Švejk] ‘epic time’ rules; that is, time defined by the 
movement of the action [syuzhet] and indispensable for this movement.”  Bernshtein later 
remarks of the same novel: “Quite often we are dealing, in Hašek, with ‘open time,’ as 
defined by G. S. Likhachev, that is with a time defined by the pace of historical events.” I. 
Bernshtein, “Pokhozhdeniya bravogo soldata Švejka” Jaroslava Hašeka [Jaroslav Hašek’s 
“The Adventures of the Good Soldier Švejk], Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, 1971: 
23-24.  Cf. John Gatt-Rutter, “Macrohistories and microhistories: Jaroslav Hašek’s Osudy 
dobrého vojáka Švejka za sv_tové války,” Journal of European Studies, xxi (1991): 1-17. 
26 Cf. Luca Curti, “Zeno guarisce dell’ottimismo: Schopenhauer e Freud nella 
Coscienza,”Rivista di Letteratura Italiana XII: 2-3 (1994): 401-27 (see 415). 
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own health my destiny had to change and warm me up with struggle 
and above all with triumph.  It was my business that cured me and I 
want Dr S. to know that.]  Zeno’s words “lotta” and “trionfo” refer to 
business competition, but given the immediate historical context they 
cannot but evoke the struggle of nations and the triumph hoped for out 
of the slaughter then going on. 
Here is part of the performativity of Svevo’s text, a speech act and 
an intervention in history calculated to outrage the ultra-nationalism of 
a Trieste and of the new Fascist Italy for whom that war had been a 
heroic struggle and a hard-won triumph, with the “redemption” of 
Trieste itself for Italy as one of the dearest prizes.  The hostile silence 
that the novel encountered in Italy, and especially in Trieste, is 
testimony to its over-performativity, its excessive success in 
demystifying war.   
The pacifist investment can be related to something as far back in 
Svevo’s life as his school days in Segnitz, Germany (1874-78), and the 
influence of his headmaster Samuel Spier, who demonstrated in 1870 
against the German invasion of France and suffered imprisonment and 
ruin as a result.
27
  That Spier had not been forgotten appears from a 
jotting of Svevo’s of the end of 1925:  “Povero Spier!  Adesso che a 
lui penso egli giace sottoterra tranquillo.  E io, quassú, anche 
tranquillo.  Egli fece quello che poté ed è quello che faccio anch’io 
ora.” [Poor Spier!  Now as I think of him he lies tranquil beneath 
ground.  And I, above ground, tranquil too.  He did what he could 
and that is what I am now doing also.]
28
  Zeno’s incoscienza or 
callousness as a war profiteer can be read as the sign of a further 
investment by the author – Ettore Schmitz’s quite conscious unease at 
the wealth which the firm to which he belonged was making out of 
                                                
27 Cf. Hans-Michael Hensel, “Samuel Spier,” in H.-M. Hensel and J. Gatt-Rutter, Italo Svevo – 
Samuel Spiers Schuler, Segnitz: Zeno’s Verlag, 1996 (75-123). 
28 Svevo, Racconti: 831. 
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selling paint for Dreadnoughts and U-boats and other warships of 
Britain and Italy on one side and Austria-Hungary and Germany on the 
other side in the Great War. 
I now return to the dialogue with Altieri with which I opened this 
paper, for in all of the foregoing we have been grappling with the 
elusive issue of authorial intention deduced from the text and 
supported by extra-textual evidence.  We have also been grappling 
with the issue of self-knowledge and its limits, truth-telling and its 
limits, as projected by Svevo through the figure of Zeno.  Altieri 
considers the centrality of questions of truth in the artwork within 
recent aesthetic theory: “While aesthetic theory has managed for the 
most part to turn away from questions of beauty it seems oddly bound 
to questions of truth.”
29
 
                                                
29 Altieri, op.cit.: 291.  Subsequent page-references will be given within the text. 
Whether or not we consider it “odd” that aesthetic theory should 
concern itself with issues of truth, we can accept with Altieri that “truth 
functions” inside or outside the artwork are highly problematic, 
undecidably so, in all probability.  This problematical undecidability 
gives great appeal, I think, to the program which Altieri outlines for 
aesthetic analysis and criticism: “Therefore, I propose that we shift our 
attention from the relations between interpretive statements and their 
objects to the positions that works of art make available for reflecting 
on ourselves as interpreting subjects ...,” a program that he defines as 
“a proleptic phenomenology that is intended to clarify the various 
powers cultivated for readers by the range of positions they are invited 
to occupy as interpreters ...” (291-2).  In order to “reconstitute 
subjects” Altieri takes issue with Lyotard’s apparently investment-free 
“grammar of pronouns” (315) to replace it with “an affective grammar 
of pronominal functions” (294).  In order to compensate for the limits 
of third-person objectivity and first-person subjectivity, he invokes the 
second person:  “We need to understand the distinctive role the second 
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person plays in giving the arts the personal and cultural force to impose 
pressures on our expressive lives and to cultivate modes of judgement 
not reducible to cognitive criteria” (293-4).  This recuperation of the 
personal and the experiential  through what is in effect a non plus 
ultra of pluralism is seen by Altieri as the condition of the 
reconstitution of the subject, the “I,” with its “singularities” and 
“contingencies”: “If the ‘I’ is to have significant force,” Altieri argues, 
“it must be the kind of entity that appeals to reasons without being 
determined by them: the ‘I’ must be a force we read through its 
investments and judgements, not an abstract measure to which we refer 
those activities” (295). 
All this is very suggestive if related to La coscienza di Zeno.  
Zeno’s fictive “I” is problematically projected not merely as text and 
textual “content.”  It is above all a speaking position, realised as a 
speech act, addressed to a specific second person, Dr S. (though we 
must note that Zeno’s text only refers to Dr S. in the third person), but 
addressed also to itself, Zeno’s “I” as “thou,” and also to the (fictive) 
paper Zeno is writing on, the page blanche which stands in for the 
blankness of being itself.  But of course, we are the actual readers of 
the text, the overt addressees of Dr S.’s fictive publication and the real 
addressees of Italo Svevo’s publication.  Svevo is ventriloquially and 
quizzically addressing us through his alter egos:  we as readers are 
therefore faced with two distinct operations, to read Zeno’s “I,” and to 
read that different “I” that lies behind it, Svevo’s “I,” each of them as 
an “entity that appeals to reasons without being determined by them,” 
as “a force we read through its investments and judgements, not an 
abstract measure to which we refer those activities.”
30
 
                                                
30 The “absent structure” of La coscienza di Zeno, and the “double reading” which it 
necessitates, positing an elusive authorial “I” behind or above the protagonist’s “I” has been 
well analysed by Elisabetta Bacchereti, “La struttura assente della Coscienza di Zeno,” in La 
formica e le rane: strategie della scrittura sveviana, Florence: Le Lettere, 1995: 103-149.  
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We began with the issue of historic responsibility and the evasion of 
it, the one courting the risk of the “tyranny of subjection,” the other of 
a fall into solipsism (which is merely one version of the tyranny of 
subjection). If we take seriously Altieri’s agenda of “a proleptic 
phenomenology that is intended to clarify the various powers cultivated 
for readers by the range of positions they are invited to occupy as 
interpreters,” that means we do not rest in any one interpretive stance.  
Zeno is and is not “cured,” humanity is and is not terminally diseased, 
Svevo (and we) are and are not responsible for the crimes and 
catastrophes of history, ethical issues such as these are and are not 
central to the text, or to our lives.  Rather, all interpretations, all 
readings that can be entertained and sustained need to be measured 
against one another, and conflicting interpretations, where they are 
undecidable, held in suspension.  No text more than La coscienza di 
Zeno so encourages the proliferation and competition of meanings 
within such tight parameters – is there a self?  what is it? how can it be 
known? (i.e., what truths is it capable of?)  what control does it have 
over itself?  what responsibility does it have for others?  what 
responsibility does it have for a collective human history?   
Thus, we can consider two recent readings of the novel, partly 
overlapping and partly opposed. Giuliana Minghelli takes Zeno as 
Svevo’s “unfinished” man, the corrupt soul, cunningly sheltering in the 
shadow of first one “mammoth” and then another, knowing each of 
these two “mammoths” better than they know themselves, who is 
however finally caught out in the open acting as a war profiteer, 
whereas Ada and Carla are credited with realising ethical autonomy 
and an ethical alternative.
31
  Luca Curti, on the other hand, reads the 
novel through well-focussed Schopenhauerian glasses which suggest 
that the self is unchangeable and knowable only from within through 
                                                
31 Giuliana Minghelli, “In the Shadow of the Mammoth:  Narratives of Symbiosis in La 
coscienza di Zeno,” MLN 109) 1994: 49-72. 
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memory, and concludes that Zeno has achieved this self-knowledge by 
the end of the novel and has been cured of his original optimism in 
seeking a cure, i.e., happiness.
32
  Both these readings provide 
thoughtful insights, and both of them indirectly support the thrust of 
the present paper in adducing authorial investments in anthropological 
and metaphysical truth functions which are ultimately also 
autobiographical in their reach, allowing the inference that an 
autobiographical impulse on Svevo’s part is expressed in the fictive 
analogue of Zeno’s autobiography.   
                                                
32 Curti, op. cit. 
These two (and other readings) can be measured against each other, 
drawing out their further implications in terms of the constitution of 
subjects and the possibility of ethics.  They differ in that Curti ascribes 
to Zeno within the novel the achievement of a self-awareness which 
Minghelli implicitly denies him.  They concur in denying Zeno the 
capacity to be other than he is – in denying, that is, his freedom or 
autonomy as a subject.  What cannot be determined from Minghelli’s 
reading is whether Ada and Carla are, unlike Zeno, capable of being 
other than they are.  Since they are fictional characters, discursive 
constructs, the question may appear senseless.  But if we take them as 
analogues of living people, it may not be.  The living people in this 
whole business which is La coscienza di Zeno once included the now 
dead author who assumed the virtual identity of “Italo Svevo” and 
continues a virtual existence as the authorial dimension of the text, and 
still include the now living readers who engage the text and may 
possibly be struggling to establish themselves as more than virtual 
subjects in reflecting on the pronominal relationships within the text, 
that is, the I-you relationships, as between Zeno Cosini on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, his protective mammoth-like father-figures and 
the female others such as Ada and Carla.   
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Such reflections cannot be straightforward.  The “sick” Zeno’s 
desperation at not being able to prove his “innocence” with respect to 
his father at the end of Ch. 4 and with respect to Ada and Guido at the 
end of Ch. 7 supports the notion that Zeno recognises, but cannot fulfil, 
an unrealised ethical alternative that Ada (and perhaps Carla) come to 
subscribe to.  But is their moral “health” subject to the same 
subversion as Augusta’s conformist “health,” which, when Zeno starts 
to analyse it (as he does at the beginning of Ch. 5, ‘”La moglie e 
l’amante”), turns into its opposite and appears to be a form of sickness. 
 The living reader has to presume not:  Ada and Carla’s behaviours, 
their recognitions of, or commitment to, I-thou investments, are not 
predicated on the unthinking conformity that determines Augusta’s;  
nor does Zeno succeed in deconstructing them into a form of sickness, 
as he does Augusta’s.  The virtual author and the living reader 
between them negotiate differential criteria in pronominal (I-thou) 
transactions. 
This may encourage us to venture beyond the very challenging, 
indeed disturbing, perspective of indeterminacy and undecidability 
offered by Carla Benedetti
33
 and Giulio Savelli.
34
  Benedetti, 
exploring La coscienza di Zeno in terms of narrative perspective, 
argues that it is Zeno’s voice, rather than merely his point of view, that 
establishes that Zeno’s “self-awareness, in its mystificatory activity, is 
Svevo’s central theme.”
35
  Already, in the opening of Senilità, she 
argues, Svevo was more interested in displaying his protagonist’s 
                                                
33 Carla Benedetti La soggettività nel racconto - Proust e Svevo, Naples: Liguori, 1984.  See 
Ch. III “La piccola rivoluzione copernicana di Zeno”: 101-126;  and “Nota conclusiva”: 
127-131. 
34 Giulio Savelli L’ambiguità necessaria:  Zeno e il suo lettore, Milan: FrancoAngeli,1998. 
35 “La coscienza di sé come attività mistificante è il tema centrale dell’opera di Svevo ... ciò che  
gli interessava non era tanto il punto di vista del personaggio, ma proprio la sua voce, la 
possibilità di mettere in scena le menzogne di un soggetto attraverso il suo stesso discorso.”  
Benedetti, op.cit.: 25. “Svevo non mira al gioco verità/menzogna ... ciò che interessa è il 
meccanismo della menzogna sulla menzogna.” Ibid.: 104.  
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entanglement in his own untruths than in bringing out truths.
36
  And 
she eloquently describes Zeno Cosini’s entrapment in his own 
compulsive  mystifications, his subjection to his own self-assertion as 
a subject.
37
  We have here the ultimate, irreducible instance of what 
we might call fictive determinism – the canon whereby a character in a 
narrative or dramatic fiction  cannot be other than he or she is.   
If we see Svevo’s textual artefact as a potential instrument for 
reconstituting subjects, we must now ask whether, and how, if at all, 
we, as readers, can escape Zeno’s entrapment in his own discourse.  
Savelli is not the first to note that Zeno’s self-parodying and 
self-ironising chatter works insidiously to captivate the reader and draw 
him into complicity.
38
  (There is in any case a strong pressure in 
first-person narrative to set up an identification of narrator with author 
on the one hand and with reader on the other.)  The reader is thus 
drawn into a “truth game” with “fake epiphanies” and is lost in Zeno’s 
mystifications.
39
  Savelli’s argument, encapsulated in the title of his 
book, is that Zeno’s discourse embodies the “necessary ambiguity” of 
our postmodern age, which is now “beyond narrative” (“non è 
piu`narrabile”).
40
  For Savelli: 
                                                
36 “Svevo non mira al gioco verità/menzogna ... ciò che interessa è il meccanismo della 
menzogna sulla menzogna.” Ibid.: 104. 
37 “Egli può dire tutto e il contrario di tutto e di questo venir meno alle sue responsabilità di 
enunciatore si compiace...  L’autorivelazione del personaggio, quasi per ironia dell’arte, si 
trasforma in autodeterminazione.  La parola su di sé, che doveva liberarlo dalla coazione 
d’identità, è nella Coscienza di Zeno ciò che  lo assoggetta maggiormente a un’identità 
coatta.”  Ibid.: 121-2. 
38 Savelli, op. cit.: 35-6. 
39 Ibid.: 36-8. 
40 Ibid.: 116-18. 
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Il nuovo assetto narrativo non soltanto implica 
l’impossibilità sia pratica sia teorica di rilevare la 
verità nascosta dietro il discorso di Zeno. ... Implica, in 
definitiva, una contraddittorietà nelle stesse norme 
interne al testo ... l’autore implicito vuole Zeno 
inattendibile e attendibile ...  Non è solo il discorso di 
Zeno a essere senza verità, è l’autore implicito a 





[The new narrative system does not only imply both 
the practical and the theoretical impossibility of 
identifying the truth that lies hidden behind Zeno’s 
discourse. ... It implies, in the end,  a contradiction in 
the text’s own inner norms ...  the implied author 
presents Zeno as being both unreliable and reliable...  
It is not only Zeno’s discourse which is devoid of 
truth, so is the implied author. ... Zeno’s lies are 
phoney deceptions.] 
 
For Savelli, then, the implied author Italo Svevo posts no objectively 
certifiable version of events, no “truth.”  We may accept this, and 
draw from it the implied corollary  that neither does the implied author 
subscribe to any reliable criteria of ethical judgement.  All that is left, 
Savelli says (and he appears to predicate this both of the character 
Zeno and of the implied author Svevo, tendentially implying their 
identity), is the guerrilla strategy whereby the character (and implied 
author?) struggles to establish an authentic identity, his own “truth,” 
amid the shifting sands of modernity for which the Great War appears 
in the novel’s finale as the universalising instance.
42
 
                                                
41 Ibid.: 115. 
42 Ibid.: 123. 
 
 48 
Zeno’s voice, however, is not the only one in the novel, even 
leaving aside Dr. S’s, which frames Zeno’s entire self-presentation.  
Other voices come through convincingly, even though relayed by Zeno 
himself: Ada’s and Carla’s, as has been mentioned, but also Augusta’s, 
the elder Cosini’s, and others.  And the war itself, as the voice of that 
awesome power of history, is one which Zeno’s certainly cannot drown 
out or domesticate, however much he sandwiches it between 
Chaplinesque farce and global catastrophe.  The implied author, then, 
while not prescribing ethical criteria, delivers perspectives which admit 
no evasion of personal responsibility – that is, of defining oneself in 
ethical terms.  Zeno, in so abysmally failing to reconstitute himself as 
a responsible subject, forces the reader to choose between complicity 
and critique. 
However, Zeno himself provides such perspectives, only to cloud 
them in hilarious mystification.  An instance of this occurs in “Il 
fumo,” where Zeno confesses to his doctor (“Fui sincero come in 
confessione”), as a symptom of his presumed malady, his 
indiscriminate desire for women not in their entirety but for their 
various parts.  The doctor sees this as a sign of normality, but Zeno 
ostentatiously records his disagreement: 
 
Dissi allora una parola importante: 
– L’amore sano è quello che abbraccia una donna 
sola e intera, compreso il suo carattere e la sua 
intelligenza. 
Fino ad allora non avevo certo conosciuto un tale 
amore e quando mi capitò non mi diede neppur esso la 
salute, ma è importante per me ricordare di aver 
rintracciata la malattia dove un dotto vedeva la salute e 
che la mia diagnosi si sia poi avverata.
43
 
                                                





[I then pronounced an important statement: 
“Healthy love is that which which embraces one 
woman, single and entire, including her character and 
her intelligence.” 
I had of course not up to that point known such 
love and when it befell me to do so even that did not 
give me health, but it is important to me to recall 
having traced sickness where an expert saw health and 
that my diagnosis was to be confirmed.] 
 
Whether or not we accept Zeno’s societally derived valuation of 
exclusive pair-bonding, romantic love, or what he elsewhere calls 
“santa monogamia,” it is clear that here he proclaims an ethical 
criterion.  But mystification quickly sets in.  He says nothing about 
the complete love he claims to have experienced at some later time, 
except that it did not give him health.  If he is referring to his love for 
Ada, which purports to be of this kind, its authenticity is undercut by 
the very notion of using it as an avenue to health.  But, whoever the 
woman concerned, if that experience did not bring Zeno health, it is 
impossible to tell how it confirmed his hypothesis, as he claims it does. 
This loose thread that Zeno has characteristically let drop may 
perhaps be picked up again at the beginning of “La storia del mio 
matrimonio.”  Just before Zeno meets Ada, he tells us: “Trascurai una 
fanciulla che per un momento avrei creduto facesse al caso mio e restai 
attaccato al mio futuro suocero.  Mi verrebbe voglia anche di credere 
al destino.”
44
  He then passes on to describe his relationship with his 
father-in-law, Malfenti, from their first meeting to the latter’s death, 
and then, apparently having forgotten mentioning the young lady he 
had been interested in, re-introduces her seven pages later: 
                                                
44 “I neglected a girl who I might momentarily have thought suited my need and remained 
attached to my future father-in-law.  It might even make me feel inclined to believe in 




Fu forse un caso che prima di presentarmi in casa 
Malfenti io mi fossi liberato da un legame abbastanza 
antico con una donna che forse avrebbe meritato un 
trattamento migliore.  Ma un caso che dà da pensare. 
La decisione a tale distacco fu presa per ragione ben 
lieve.  Alla poverina era parso un bel sistema di 
legarmi meglio a lei, quello di rendermi geloso. Il 
sospetto invece bastò per indurmi ad abbandonarla 
definitivamente.  Essa non poteva sapere che io ero 
allora invaso dall’idea del matrimonio e che non 
potevo contrarlo con lei, solo perché con lei la novità 
non mi sarebbe sembrata abbastanza grande.  Il 
sospetto ch’essa aveva fatto nascere in me ad arte era 
una dimostrazione della superiorità del matrimonio nel 
quale tali sospetti non devono sorgere.  Quando quel 
sospetto di cui sentii presto l’inconsistenza dileguò, 
ricordai anche ch’essa spendeva troppo.  Oggidì, 
dopo ventiquattr’anni di onesto matrimonio, non sono 
più di quel parere. 
Per essa fu una vera fortuna perché, pochi mesi 
dopo, fu sposata da persona molto abbiente ed ottenne 
l’ambito mutamento prima di me.  Non appena 
sposato me la trovai in casa perché il marito era un 
amico di mio suocero.  C’incontrammo spesso, ma, 
per molti anni, finché fummo giovani, fra noi regnò il 
massimo riserbo e mai si fece allusione al passato.  
L’altro giorno ella mi domandò a bruciapelo, con la 
sua faccia incorniciata da capelli grigi giovanilmente 
arrossata: 
– Perché mi abbandonaste?  
Io fui sincero perché non ebbi il tempo necessario 
per fabbricare una bugia: 
–  Non lo so più, ma ignoro anche tante altre cose 
della mia vita. 
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– A me dispiace, – ella disse e già m’inchinavo al 
complimento che così mi prometteva. – Nella 
vecchiaia mi sembrate un uomo molto divertente. – Mi 




[It was perhaps by chance that before I presented 
myself at the Malfentis’ I had freed myself from a 
fairly long attachment to a woman who should perhaps 
have deserved better treatment.  But that chance 
circumstance gives food for thought.  The rupture was 
decided on fairly trifling grounds.  The poor girl had 
thought that a fine way of binding me fast to her 
would be to make me jealous.  In fact the very 
suspicioin was enough to make me drop her for good.  
She had no way of knowing that at that time I was 
obsessed with the idea of marriage and that I thought I 
could not undertake it with her simply because with 
her the novelty wouldn’t have seemed great enough.  
The suspicion that she had artfully roused in me was 
proof of the superiority of marriage in which such 
suspicions must not arise.  When that suspicion, 
whose lack of substance I quickly sensed, faded, I 
recalled also that she spent too much.  Today, after 
twenty-four years of honorable matrimony, I’m no 
longer of that opinion.   
For her it was a real piece of luck because, a few 
months later, she became the wife of a very wealthy 
person and achieved the desired change of state before 
I did.  No sooner was I myself married than I found 
her in my house as her husband was a friend of my 
father-in-law’s.  We met frequently, but, for many 
years, while we were young, the height of discretion 
prevailed between us and no reference was ever made 
                                                
45 Ibid.: 719-20. 
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to the past.  The other day she asked me point-blank, 
with a youthful blush on her face surrounded by grey 
hair: “Why did you leave me?” 
I was sincere because I didn’t have time to make 
up a lie: “I no longer know, but I’m ignorant about 
plenty of other things in my life.” 
“I regret it,” she said, and I was already bowing to 
receive the promised compliment. “In your old age 
you strike me as being most amusing.”  I drew myself 
up with an effort.  I had nothing to thank her for.] 
 
This microcosmic instance of Zeno’s compulsive mystifications ushers 
in the central part of the novel, comprising its three longest chapters, 
and ties up the initial moment of the narrative (before the meeting with 
Malfenti) with the present in which Zeno is writing his recollections 
(‘”Oggidì, dopo ventiquattr’anni di onesto matrimonio,” “L’altro 
giorno”).  He doesn’t have time to tell a lie, but what he so sincerely 
says conflicts with all the other reasons he gives for having left the girl. 
 Perhaps her question of a few days earlier has made him recall the 
until then forgotten circumstances, but the reasons he recalls still jostle 
with one another unconvincingly, and each of them is quickly undercut 
– jealousy, boredom, economy.  The reader is left wondering whether 
any of them were genuine, or whether indeed there was any genuine 
reason, as the reader is left wondering about Zeno’s proclaimed 
amnesia and sincerity.  Can Zeno lie even when he most earnestly 
protests his sincerity?  And if he boasts of lying if given enough time, 
not only can we not confidently believe anything he puts down in 
writing, but we also have to reckon with the liar’s paradox (“I always 
tell lies”).  But perhaps for once the liar is telling the truth, and really 
does not know himself.  If Savelli is right, and reality – within or 
outside oneself – is unknowable, then any statement must be arbitrary, 
and the question of truth-value irrelevant. 
This is the zero position.  But it is Zeno’s position, and not, 
arguably, even demonstrably, that of the implied author.  It is a 
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nihilist, corrosive,  critical, ironic position, deadly in demolishing false 
positives.  But though Zeno by his conscious and unconscious  
mystifications attempts to demolish all truth values and all ethical 
values that threaten his identity, he does not always succeed.  He does 
not demolish all of even those positives which he himself enunciates.  
Not, for instance, the possibility of serious love between a man and a 
woman.  This surfaces again when Zeno is equivocating between his 
wife and his mistress Carla, telling Carla that he bears esteem and 
affection towards his wife, though she was not his real choice.  He 
reflects: 
 
C’era qualche centro proibitivo che agiva ancora in 
me.  Avevo detto di stimare mia moglie, ma non 
avevo mica ancora detto di non amarla.  Non avevo 
detto che mi piacesse, ma neppure che non potesse 
piacermi. In quel momento mi pareva di essere molto 
sincero; ora so di aver tradito con quelle parole tutt’e 




[There was some centre of prohibition still at work 
within me.  I had said I held my wife in esteem, but I 
hadn’t yet said I didn’t love her.  I hadn’t said I 
fancied her, but neither had I said that I couldn’t fancy 
her.  At that moment I felt I was being most sincere; 
now I know that with those words I betrayed both 
women and the whole of love, both mine and theirs.] 
 
                                                
46 Ibid.: 864. 
Even if Zeno is now being as disingenuous as he had been before, he is 
subscribing to an unrealised ethical alternative in I-thou relationships.  
Just as when he most loudly protests his innocence and thus voices his 
sense of guilt, he is subscribing to implicit criteria  for discriminating 
between the two.  The coscienza that from time to time breaks through 
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Zeno’s incoscienza is the desire for authentic living in authentic 
relationships, the desire adumbrated in Svevo’s jotting of 25 October 
1917 to “go outside time and space” so that “we shall all know each 
other so intimately that that will be the path towards sincerity.  We 
will all ‘thou’ one another and laugh at one another as we deserve.  
That will be the final death of literature which is all too intimate a part 
of our spirit and we will see right into each other.” This is the 
“macabre prospect” that Zeno, through Svevo, has given us of himself. 
 
 (La Trobe University) 
